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methodological choices using a microsimulation model of Social Security benefits and employer-
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Retirement Replacement Rates: What and How
Andrew G. Biggs
Replacement rates are a common measure of retirement income adequacy
used by households to gauge their own saving for retirement, and by
policymakers to assess the effectiveness of government and private pensions
in providing income for the retired population. Replacement rates repre-
sent retirement income as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings and thus
assess households’ ability to maintain their pre-retirement levels of con-
sumption once they have ceased working. A replacement rate of 100 percent
is not necessary, as retirees face lower taxes and work-related costs, and they
often have paid off their mortgages and completed their saving for retire-
ment. Nevertheless, the ratio provides an intuitive yardstick for retirement
income adequacy.
While seemingly simple, replacement rates can be measured in different
ways based on different concepts of retirement income adequacy. These
differences have important implications for our assessment of Americans’
retirement saving. Discussion of the methodology of replacement rates was
ignited when, in 2014, the Social Security Trustees opted to remove from
their annual report tables that represented Social Security replacement
rates for stylized workers with different levels of lifetime earnings (Social
Security Trustees 2014). The replacement rate data in earlier annual Trust-
ees reports had informed howmany policymakers thought about retirement
policy. Yet the Social Security Trustees warned in 2013 that replacement
rates figures in their report produced ‘percentages that may differ signifi-
cantly from those that would be produced by comparing benefits to these
representative workers’ recent average earnings levels or to other, more
common measures of pre-retirement income’ (2013: 143). Those figures
were deleted entirely in 2014, and it is not clear when and in what form they
might reappear.
This chapter discusses three topics pertaining to replacement rates calcu-
lations. First, I ask whether policymakers should continue to rely upon
stylized hypothetical earnings patterns in illustrating replacement rates, or
whether they should turn to administrative data and microsimulation
models whose output is, while more complex, capable of producing a
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more realistic and nuanced view of retirement income adequacy. Second,
I address the question of how pre-retirement earnings should be repre-
sented in the replacement rate calculation. Most analysts agree that
career-average earnings are a better measure of the pre-retirement standard
of living than earnings in a single year immediately prior to retirement. Yet
there is disagreement on whether pre-retirement earnings should be
adjusted for growth in the cost of living or for growth in national average
wages. This disagreement is based upon conceptual differences in how
analysts view the purpose of retirement saving. Third, I examine the ques-
tion of how children affect parents’ need to save for retirement. Adjust-
ments for differences in family size and composition have a significant
impact upon measured retirement income adequacy. Indeed, several prom-
inent studies that find undersaving for retirement to be a modest problem
utilize family-size adjustments, while studies concluding that retirement
undersaving is a much larger problem fail to adjust for the presence of
children.
Finally, I illustrate the effects of different methods of calculating replace-
ment rates using a microsimulation model of Social Security and employer-
sponsored pensions. The Policy Simulation Group models are used to
project Social Security benefits and pension incomes for members of the
1940 birth cohort.
While replacement rates are a seemingly simple concept, analysts face a
range of choices regarding the type of pre-retirement earnings to be illus-
trated, how those earnings should be adjusted for changes in the cost or the
standard of living, and how household size and composition should
be accounted for in replacement rate calculations. There are many plausible
combinations of such choices, such that a given level of retirement income
could be characterized as wholly inadequate to overgenerous, depending
upon the way in which the replacement rate is structured. How replacement
rates are defined and calculated is crucial for assessing Americans’ pre-
paredness for retirement. In other words, the question on Americans’
retirement security is not simply ‘How much income will retirees have?’
but ‘How much is enough?’ It would be impossible to review here every
possible combination of choices for calculating replacement rates. In what
follows, however, I review the focal points of current policy discussions and
illustrate the range of possible outcomes.
The Use of Stylized Earners versus Microsimulation
Probably the best-known replacement rate figures are published by the US
Social Security Administration, which administers the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance program that is commonly referred to as ‘Social Security.’ The SSA
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is the source of the well-known statistic that, for an average earner, Social
Security retirement benefits will replace only about 40 percent; moreover,
SSA states that, according to most financial advisors, retirees need 70 percent
of their pre-retirement earnings to sustain their pre-retirement standard of
living (SSA 2014). This leads to the conclusion that Social Security benefits
provide roughly 40/70ths, or 57 percent, of what a typical individual requires
to maintain his standard of living in retirement.1
The SSA’s replacement rates figure for its ‘medium earner,’ along with those
for ‘low’ and ‘high’ earners, are calculated using stylized earnings patterns
rather than directly from administrative data. The evolution of these stylized
earnings patterns is worth analyzing. The SSA initially illustrated replacement
rates using so-called ‘steady earners,’ who in each year of their working lives
were assumed to earn a stated percentage of the Average Wage Index (AWI).
For instance, the medium steady earner always earned 100 percent of the AWI,
the low earner 45 percent, and the high earner 160 percent. Replacement rates
were calculated by comparing benefits at the normal retirement age (then 65)
to nominal earnings in the year prior to retirement.
Over time, however, it became clear that these steady earnings patterns
failed to match the inverted U-shaped age-earnings profile typical of
actual workers. As Munnell and Soto put it, these steady earnings patterns
‘bore little relation to reality’ (2005: 8). In response to such concerns, SSA
introduced in 2011 its so-called ‘scaled earners’ with more representative
earnings patterns. The broad age-earnings profiles were derived from
administrative data, but the level of annual earnings was calibrated such
that, in combination with a change in calculation methods, replacement
rates for the hypothetical scaled earners would equal those calculated using
the prior steady earners. Thus, while the new scaled earnings patterns are
more realistic than the previous SSA steady earners, the methodology was
structured to maintain the results calculated under the previous steady
earner approach.2
The new SSA scaled earners are used to illustrate benefits payable under
current law, such as in the annual Trustees Report, as well as in reform
proposals that would change the benefits to which retirees become entitled.
One problem with these improved scaled earners is that they are still not
particularly representative of the typical earner. For instance, scaled earners
are assumed to work every year from age 21 to age 65, when most real-world
individuals take at least some time away from the workforce and tend to
claim benefits before the Full Retirement Age of 66. Individuals at risk of
poverty in retirement are most likely to have had a short working life than
a long working life at low wages as per SSA’s scaled low earner. Likewise,
even the scaled medium earner has annual earnings that are substantially
higher than those of a typical individual in the workforce (Mitchell and
Phillips 2006).
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A second problem is that these stylized earners are most informative for
illustrating benefits for never-married workers, whereas most Social Security
participants are married, divorced, or widowed. This is important because
households tend to make saving and consumption decisions as a unit, and
also because a significant portion of Social Security benefits is paid to
spouses and widows. Roughly 23 percent of female retirees in 2012 received
a benefit that was in part or whole based upon their spouse’s earnings
record (SSA 2013). If marital benefits are not accounted for, the effects of
Social Security’s auxiliary benefits are understated.
It is not that replacement rates have never been calculated using real-
world data. Both Nichols (1977) and Grad (1990) used Social Security
administrative data to calculate benefit replacement rates for retirees. Yet
the use of administrative and microsimulation data has become increasingly
common in recent years. The SSA Office of Disability and Retirement Policy
utilizes a microsimulation model known as MINT (Modeling Income in the
Near Term) as its principal tool for benefit analysis. The Congressional
Budget Office uses the CBOLT (CBO Long-Term) model, and the Govern-
ment Accountability Office uses the PSG models that are used in this
chapter. More recently, SSA’s Office of the Chief Actuary has published
replacement rate figures based upon administrative data. Analysts outside
the government can now utilize public use earnings and benefits data made
available by SSA.
The better data allow for a much more realistic view of individual workers,
capturing differences in years in the workforce, age-earnings profiles, age of
retirement, and other factors that affect Social Security benefits and retire-
ment income. Moreover, microsimulation data allow analysis of households,
calculating the interactions of peoples’ earnings in determining Social
Security benefits. This approach provides a much more accurate represen-
tation of the replacement rates payable to female retirees, who are the main
recipients of Social Security auxiliary benefits.
The ability to group individuals into households is extremely important in
overcoming some of the limitations of replacement rates as a measure of
retirement income adequacy. For instance, a spouse who stays home to care
for the couple’s children may receive an extremely high (or even infinite)
replacement rate relative to her own earnings, but her earnings are not
representative of the standard of living she enjoyed prior to retirement.
Combining spouses into a single household unit that shares earnings and
benefits equally provides a better picture of the role Social Security plays in
the household’s retirement preparation. A similar point can be made when
pensions and other retirement savings enter the picture.
There seems little reason for policymakers or analysts to continue to rely
principally upon stylized workers when administrative data or microsimula-
tion models are increasingly available, particularly as the latter provide a
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more detailed and nuanced view of Social Security and retirement income
than previously available. They also allow potential Social Security reforms
to more accurately target individuals who, due to having earnings patterns
or other characteristics not typical of a stylized full-career earning, may not
be well-served by the current benefit formula.
How Should Prior Earnings Be Expressed?
A replacement rate expresses retirement income as a percentage of pre-
retirement earnings. There is a debate over how the denominator of the
calculation—pre-retirement earnings—should be measured.
Traditionally, replacement rates have expressed retirement income
as a percentage of workers’ pre-retirement earnings. This was how the SSA
calculated replacement rates for its stylized ‘steady earners.’ Moreover,
traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans still continue to calculate
replacement rates in such a way, since benefits under such plans are calcu-
lated relative to some measure of final earnings.
Yet many policy analysts argue today that replacement rates are better
calculated relative to a longer-term average of pre-retirement earnings.
Earnings in a single year can fluctuate significantly and hence may not be
representative of the standard of living that pre-retirement earnings pro-
vided over the longer term.
Due in part to the Social Security Trustees removing replacement rates
from their annual report, there has recently been significant discussion of
how career-average pre-retirement earnings should be represented. SSA
calculates replacement rates by comparing Social Security benefits in the
first year of retirement to the average of the highest 35 years of pre-
retirement earnings, indexed for the growth of average economy-wide
wages. This so-called ‘wage indexing’ increases past nominal earnings by
the ratio of SSAs’ Average Wage Index (AWI) in the year the individual
turned age 64 to the AWI in the year the earnings took place.
Since the AWI generally rises about one percentage point faster than
the Consumer Price Index, this process will produce higher measured
pre-retirement earnings, and lower replacement rates of pre-retirement
earnings, than a replacement rate calculation that utilizes nominal or
inflation-indexed earnings. The wage-indexed average of lifetime earnings
is generally about one-fifth higher than inflation-indexed earnings, leading
to a proportional reduction in measured replacement rates. In its National
Retirement Risk Index (NRRI), the Center for Retirement Research applies
a replacement rate calculation very similar to SSA OACT’s to overall retire-
ment income, concluding that a majority of working-age Americans are ‘at
risk’ of falling below target levels of retirement income.3
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The theory underlying ‘wage-indexed replacement rates’ is that retired
households want their standard of living to increase in step with the stand-
ard of living of active workers. Literally speaking, the replacement rate for
SSA’s stylized ‘scaled medium earner’ is equal to the benefit received by this
earner in retirement divided by the AWI at the time he retires.4 That is,
wage-indexed replacement rates effectively compare income for retirees to
the earnings of contemporaneous workers.
Munnell, one of the co-authors of the CRR’s NRRI, states that ‘When
constructing the NRRI targets, my colleagues and I made a conscious
decision to assume that households had a preference for a standard of living
that increased during their working lives at the rate of economy-wide wage
growth. This assumption reflected our belief that households care not only
about their absolute standard of living, but also about their relative standard
of living’ (2014). One can think of this as a ‘keeping up with the Joneses,’
relative-income approach reminiscent of Duesenberry (1949) or, more
recently, Frank (2005).
Nevertheless, a number of commentators have expressed concern that
indexing pre-retirement earnings for economy-wide wage growth, rather than
merely for the growth of prices, overstates what households consider to be an
adequate retirement income. Steuerle et al. observe that ‘many retirees may be
satisfied just to maintain their ability to purchase: They want the same purchas-
ing power they’ve had all along. If this is the case, replacement rates could be
derived from individual wages adjusted for inflation instead of wage growth.
Since prices usually rise more slowly than wages, this would result in lower past
wages and higher replacement rates’ (2000: 1–2). Or, as the Congressional
Budget Office recently stated, ‘Indexing earnings to prices better captures the
real amount of resources available to a worker over his or her lifetime, whereas
indexing earnings to wages may overstate those amounts’ (2014: 16).5
Thus, a more plausible approach may be to compare retirees’ Social
Security benefits or total retirement incomes to the purchasing power of
their pre-retirement earnings. This approach is more reminiscent of a
simplified life-cycle model in which individuals seek to consume more or
less the same amount from year to year. For instance, the financial planning
program ‘ESPlanner,’ which applies the life-cycle model to retirement
planning, seeks to calculate the highest level of steady, inflation-adjusted
consumption that an individual or household can maintain over its life-
time.6 A replacement rate calculated relative to inflation-adjusted pre-
retirement earnings is a simple approximation of such an approach.7
The differences between these two measures can be substantial. For
instance, the Congressional Budget Office (2014) recently projected that
Social Security will provide the average retiree born in the 1960s with a wage-
indexed replacement rate of 46 percent, versus a price-indexed replace-
ment rate of 58 percent.8
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Neither price-indexed nor wage-indexed replacement rates fully capture
all the factors that affect saving and consumption, such as time preferences,
precautionary saving, borrowing constraints, and uncertainty regarding
future earnings. But this should not be a disqualification, given replacement
rates’ role as a simplified rule-of-thumb that is accessible to savers
and policymakers lacking specialized knowledge. At a minimum, offering
replacement rates calculated using both inflation-indexed and wage-
indexed pre-retirement earnings, as in CBO (2014), makes readers more
aware of the importance of these definitional choices.
Adjusting Replacement Rates for Household
Size and Composition
Another area of disagreement pertains to how measures of retirement
income adequacy should account for the effects of children on their par-
ents’ need to save for retirement. The justification for such an adjustment is
that households with children need not save as much for retirement as
households without children, because part of parents’ income during
their working years is consumed by their children. Skinner describes the
logic in humorous terms:
Parents are already used to getting by on peanut butter, given that a large fraction
of their pre-retirement budget has been devoted to supporting children, so it’s
not difficult to set aside enough money to keep them in peanut butter through
retirement. By contrast, childless households with the same income accustomed
to caviar and fine wine must set aside more assets to maintain themselves in the
style to which they have become accustomed. (2007: 69)
In this context, the costs of raising children are akin to the costs of paying off
a mortgage or saving for retirement: they represent foregone consumption
during the household’s working years that need not be replaced once the
household has retired. Put simply, parents do not need to replace consump-
tion they never had. Notably, studies that find higher levels of retirement
saving adequacy, such as Gale et al. (2009) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2011,
2014), use a family-size adjustment. By contrast, the Center for Retirement
Research’s NRRI adjusts target replacement rates for single individuals
versus couples, but it makes no adjustment for whether retirees had chil-
dren. The NRRI’s designers argue that, once children leave home, parents
‘take over’ their children’s share of household consumption and wish to
maintain this higher standard of living through retirement.
This remains an open area for research. Some research focuses on house-
hold wealth accumulation. For instance, Engen et al. (1999) find that
households with high saving rates and above-average wealth tend to have
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fewer children than low-saving households. Likewise, Scholz and Seshadri
(2007) show that households with children hold less average wealth than
similar households that did not have children. From these results, Scholz
and Seshadri conclude that parents tend to save to replace their own pre-
retirement consumption, implying that analysis of retirement saving
adequacy should account for household size. Another research path focuses
on how household saving patterns change when children leave the home. If
children depress household saving, then one might expect saving to
increase once children have left the nest. There are a number of reasons
why such a change may not be apparent. For instance, inertia may cause
households to leave contribution rates to employer-sponsored pension
plans unchanged even after children leave, at least delaying changes to
saving rates. Likewise, college tuition or loan payments for children may
continue even after children have technically left home, making measure-
ment of saving changes more difficult. Also, parents may wish to enjoy a
temporary splurge in spending after children have left home.
Coe and Webb (2010) follow households in several waves of the Health
and Retirement Study, concluding that parents do not appear to reduce
their consumption once children leave home. However, that study has been
criticized for relying upon a sample of only 36 households whose parents
were unusually old at the time their children left home. Klos and Rottke use
a larger German dataset to analyze how parents respond to children leaving
home. They find that ‘household consumption drops and saving rises sig-
nificantly within four years after a child moves out of a household’ (2013:
p. ii). However, for college-educated parents, who are more likely to have
children attending college and thus continuing college-related costs, the
transition to higher saving takes longer than four years. Klos and Rottke
conclude that ‘Assuming that household consumption remains constant
after a child’s move-out would overstate the problem of inadequate saving’
(2013: 20).
Analysts taking an alternate approach rely on subjective assessments of
retirement income adequacy. As already noted, households with children
appear to have lower average wealth than childless households. This result
implies either that parents save to replace their own pre-retirement con-
sumption rather than the household’s total consumption, or that house-
holds with children undersave for retirement compared to similar childless
households. If the latter is true, then having children can be seen as
detrimental to parents’ retirement planning. In the latter case one would
expect that retirees who had children would express greater reservations
than non-parents about their income security and quality of life. Rohwedder
(2006) used Health and Retirement Study data to analyze respondents’
answers to questions including, ‘All in all, would you say that your retirement
has turned out to be very satisfying, moderately satisfying, or not at all
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satisfying?’; ‘Would you say the retirement years have been better, about the
same, or not as good?’; and ‘Please tell me if you worry a lot, somewhat, a
little, or not at all [about] not having enough income to get by.’ She found
no significant difference in how retired parents answered these questions
versus similar non-parents, buttressing the notion that having children
affects parents’ retirement saving in predictable and rational ways.
To illustrate the effects of adjusting replacement rates for household size
and composition, the following sections will use the framework established
in Citro and Michael (1995) to calculate the number of ‘adult equivalents’
living in a household. It takes the form
Adulte quivalents ¼ ðA þ PK ÞF
where A is the number of adults in the family, K is the number of children, P is
the cost of a child relative to an adult, and F is a factor reflecting economies of
scale in household size. Following common usage, I assume a of value 0.7 for
both P and F. Lower values of P will result in relatively lower costs of living for a
child versus an adult household member, while lower values of F will result in
larger economies of scale as household size increases. I assume that children
are counted as part of households until age 21.
In any given year, an individual’s earnings are taken to equal total house-
hold earnings divided by the number of adult equivalents in the household.
Career-average earnings are based on the annual family-size adjusted earn-
ings. Thus, this process accounts for earnings when the respondent is single,
married, divorced, or remarried; and when childless, when children are
living at home, and when children have left home. Similarly, the respond-
ent’s total household Social Security or other retirement income is divided
by the number of adult equivalents at the time the replacement rate is
calculated. For the small number of retiree households who have children
living at home, the family-adjustment is applied to Social Security and
pension benefits.
Illustrating Social Security Replacement Rates
We develop replacement rates using a suite of microsimulation models
developed by the Policy Simulation Group (PSF).9 These models simulate
the US population’s participation in the Social Security program and
employer-sponsored DB and defined contribution (DC) pension plans.
Used by the Social Security Administration, the Department of Labor,
and the Government Accountability Office, these models are calibrated to
reproduce both system-level and distributional outcomes similar to those
generated by Social Security’s Board of Trustees and the Social Security
Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary.
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The denominators used in the replacement rate calculations are based
upon the present value of individual or household earnings from ages 21
through 65, calculated using the historical or projected yield on the Social
Security Trust Funds. This present value is converted to a steady earnings
path that increases annually either with the AWI or the Consumer Price
Index (CPI). These figures are qualitatively similar to the indexed average of
pre-retirement earnings used in other studies, but they are designed to
include earnings-years and to be consistent with the present value of lifetime
earnings.10
I illustrate the results using individuals born in 1940 who survive to age 70.
Age 70 is chosen because practically all eligible individuals will have claimed
Social Security benefits by then.11 Social Security replacement rates
equal the individual’s total scheduled Social Security benefit including any
auxiliary supplement, as a percentage of the average of the individual’s
own highest 35 years of earnings. A couple’s replacement rate equals the
couple’s total Social Security benefit divided by the couple’s average pre-
retirement earnings. Combined replacement rates include Social Security
benefits, DB pensions payments, and the value of employer-sponsored DC
pensions expressed as an inflation-indexed annuity payment. Retirement
saving outside of employer-sponsored plans is not included in these calcu-
lations, nor is the value of home equity.
The median individual Social Security replacement rate measured rela-
tive to AWI-indexed earnings is 60 percent. This is substantially higher than
the 40 percent commonly discussed. As mentioned earlier, the SSA states
that an average earner will receive a benefit replacement rate of 40 percent.
Likewise Goss et al. (2014) present replacement rates for individuals claim-
ing benefits in the year 2011, finding a median replacement rate relative to
wage-indexed average earnings of 39 percent. The difference between my
results and those of the SSA and Goss et al. arises due to differences in how
replacement rates are calculated, as well as in the beneficiaries and the
benefits that are included in the replacement rate calculation.
The denominator used in my figures is the wage-indexed average of all
earnings between the ages of 21 and 62, whereas SSA’s figures use the
individual’s highest 35 years of earnings. Lifetime earnings used here are
therefore lower than SSA’s calculations, and so this produces higher meas-
ured replacement rates. Yet it also provides a better measure of how indi-
viduals with different total lifetime earnings are treated by the Social
Security program.
In addition, the calculation here for the 1940 birth cohort includes all
Social Security beneficiaries who survive to age 70, including those who
collect only an auxiliary (spousal or widow) benefit. Goss et al. (2014), by
contrast, include only those who are eligible for benefits based upon their
own earnings records. Likewise, for individuals eligible for benefits based
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upon their own earnings, the calculations here include all benefits they
receive, including spousal or widow benefits. Goss et al. (2014) measure only
the benefits received based upon the beneficiary’s own earnings. This
approach significantly understates total benefits for those retirees, generally
women, who receive a spousal or widow supplement. Approximately one-
fifth of all retirees in 2012 received an auxiliary benefit, and for such
retirees, the auxiliary payment increased their total benefit by 78 percent
(Biggs et al. 2015).
The individual Social Security replacement rates presented here are a
more complete picture of the Social Security beneficiary population and the
Social Security benefits they receive, nevertheless these are difficult to
interpret. For instance, what does it mean for retirement preparedness if a
spouse who worked little outside the home receives a high benefit relative to
her own earnings, when her standard of living prior to retirement depended
on her spouse’s earnings? We believe this justifies calculating replacement
rates on a household basis. By doing so, we avoid interpretive problems
while still including the full Social Security beneficiary population and all
the benefits they receive.
When we calculate wage-indexed Social Security replacement rates on a
household basis, the median value for the 1940 birth cohort falls from 60 to
54 percent. Perhaps more important, the number of very low and very high
replacement rates is reduced. For instance, at the couple level, 10 percent of
beneficiaries receive a replacement rate above 100 percent; at the individual
level, the top 10 percent of beneficiaries receives replacement rates higher
than 165 percent.
Nevertheless these figures are calculated relative to AWI-indexed earn-
ings, which effectively compares their benefits not to their own pre-
retirement earnings, but to the earnings of active workers. A CPI-indexed
denominator in the replacement rate calculation provides a better picture
of how households’ Social Security or pension benefits compared to the
purchasing power of their own average pre-retirement earnings. The
median individual replacement rate relative to CPI-indexed pre-retirement
earnings for the 1940 birth cohort is 72 percent, versus 60 percent of wage-
indexed earnings. The median couple replacement rate is 65 percent,
versus 54 percent for couples relative to wage-indexed earnings.
Next we consider how an adjustment for family size and composition
alters replacement rates. The family-size adjustment increases the median
household Social Security replacement rate for the 1940 birth cohort from
65 to 82 percent of inflation-indexed average pre-retirement earnings. Not
surprisingly, the family-size adjustments are smallest for those who were
never married, where median replacement rates rose only from 67 to 68
percent. These individuals’ replacement rates can be affected by accounting
for children. For married individuals, the effect of the family-size adjustment
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is much larger, raising median replacement rates from 61 to 82 percent. The
difference is more modest but still important for divorced individuals, where
median replacement rates rise from 64 to 75 percent. For widows and
widowers, the effect depends importantly upon gender: widowers see
increased replacement rates through a family-size adjustment, as their
share of household pre-retirement earnings is generally lower than their
own pre-retirement earnings. Replacement rates for widowers rise from 78
to 87 percent when family-size adjusted. For widows, however, the opposite is
true: median replacement rates decline from 88 to 81 percent, reflecting the
loss of economies of scale when living alone versus as a couple.
The PSG models also simulate benefits from employer-sponsored retire-
ment plans, allowing for the calculation of replacement rates covering a
greater share of total retirement income. The PSG models also simulate
pension rollovers to Individual Retirement Accounts, but they do not model
IRAs or other individual retirement saving that is funded independently of
rollovers. The approach assumes that DC pension accounts earn a return
equal to the yield on the Social Security Trust Funds. At retirement, house-
holds are assumed to convert DC pension accounts to an inflation-adjusted
annuity.
Nevertheless, the PSGmodels do not simulate the full range of retirement
income sources including housing equity, income from non-retirement
assets, and government transfer programs other than Social Security. For
the 1940 birth cohort, combined Social Security, DB, and DC pension
income amounts to about two-thirds of retired households’ total non-
earnings income, implying that total retirement income would be higher
than the combined Social Security and employer-sponsored pension bene-
fits simulated here.12
When we include income from employer-sponsored pensions along with
Social Security benefits, combined family-size adjusted replacement rates
relative to CPI-indexed pre-retirement earnings rise to 126 percent at the
median. Seventy-five percent of households have replacement rates above
85 percent of career earnings, and 90 percent of households have replace-
ment rates above 50 percent. As a result, it appears that most households at
age 70 would have a higher standard of living—after accounting for econ-
omies of scale in living costs, household income consumed by children, and
work-related costs—than their average during their pre-retirement years.
By contrast, if replacement rates are calculated relative to wage-indexed
earnings without a family-size adjustment, 43 percent of the 1940 cohort
fall short of a combined Social Security and pension replacement rate of
75 percent. Thus, much of the difference of opinion regarding whether
Americans face a retirement ‘challenge’ or a retirement ‘crisis’ is attribut-
able to differing definitions of income adequacy, rather than projections of
what Americans’ actual retirement incomes will be in dollars and cents.
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Conclusion
Replacement rates are a commonly-used measure of retirement income
adequacy by individuals, financial advisors, and policymakers, but until
recently little attention was paid to how replacement rates are calculated.
Replacement rates began with simple calculations that compared retire-
ment income to retirees’ earnings immediately preceding retirement,
using stylized workers with unrealistic earnings patterns and ignoring
the interaction of spouses’ earnings and savings. More recently however,
methods have improved through access to administrative data and micro-
simulation models, and replacement rate calculations have been applied to
career-long average earnings rather than earnings in a single year preceding
retirement.
Even so, there remain key conceptual disagreements about how to index
pre-retirement earnings in a replacement rate calculation. Price-indexed
replacement rates measure a household’s ability to replace its own average
pre-retirement consumption, while wage-indexed replacement rates effect-
ively compare the incomes of retirees to those of working-age households.
To the degree that retired households wish to maintain their own prior
levels of consumption rather than chase contemporary workers’ living
standards, replacement rates calculated relative to inflation-adjusted earn-
ings may be a better shorthand measure of retirement income adequacy.
There is also disagreement about how replacement rates should consider
the effects of children on retirement saving needs. Research in this area is
continuing, but households with children do save less for retirement than
similar households without children. Despite this, they seem not to suffer in
terms of subjective assessments of retirement income adequacy. Thus an
adjustment for family size and composition seems a reasonable way to
analyze households with and without children in a more comparable way.
Applying these different methods of calculating replacement rates to
simulated populations shows how important the definitional issues are.
Many models are used to project the earnings, Social Security benefits,
and pension income of future cohorts of US retirees. Nevertheless, differ-
ences in how retirement income adequacy is conceived of, defined, and
measured, appear to have greater impacts on perceptions of retirement
preparedness than do differences in the dollar values that different models
project. For this reason, it is extremely important that analysts and policy-
makers step back and ask what households are trying to do when they save
for retirement. Are they trying to maintain their own personal pre-
retirement consumption, or are they trying to match the amount that they
and their children consumed together? Likewise, are they concerned with
matching their pre-retirement consumption, or are they more concerned
with ‘keeping up with the Joneses,’ in the form of maintaining a standard of
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
166 Retirement System Risk Management
living in retirement that matches that of contemporaneous workers? These
conceptual questions are as important in gauging retirement income
adequacy as are the more technical issues of projecting Americans’ future
earnings, Social Security benefits, and pension incomes. While government
agencies such as the Social Security Administration, the Congressional
Budget Office, the Department of Labor, and others have expended signifi-
cant resources in projecting how much income future retirees will have, the
most fruitful step going forward may be to focus research attention more
closely on how much income future retirees will need.
Endnotes
1. This discussion draws on Biggs et al. (2015).
2. In addition to calibrating the scaled earnings patterns, SSA OACT adjusted its
approach for calculating replacement rates. Under the steady earner method-
ology, replacement rates expressed Social Security benefits to earnings in the year
immediately prior to benefit claiming. Once the scaled earner approach was
adopted, replacement rates were calculated by comparing Social Security benefits
to the average of the highest 35 years of pre-retirement earnings, where earnings
were adjusted through age 64 to the growth of overall earnings in the economy.
This new method of calculation replacement rates, along with the calibration of
pre-retirement earnings levels, allowed SSA OACT to maintain the same meas-
ured replacement rates for the low-, medium-, and high-earning scaled workers as
were produced using the previous steady earners.
3. See Munnell et al. (2006).
4. This can be demonstrated using data from table V.C7 of the 2014 Trustees Report,
which includes annual benefit amounts for the hypothetical scaled earners retir-
ing in a given year along with the annual wages paid to workers in that year. The
stylized medium earner retiring in 2014 receives an annual benefit of $19,477,
which is equal to 41.6% of the $46,787 Average Wage Index in 2014. Clingman
and Nichols (2004) calculate a wage-indexed replacement rate for a medium-
scaled relative to wage-indexed career average earnings of 41.1%, indicating that
the medium-scaled earner’s average prior earnings are almost precisely equal to
the AWI in the year he retires.
5. Also see MacDonald and Moore (2011).
6. For instance, see Bernheim, et al. (2000) and <www.ESPlanner.com>.
7. Calculating replacement rates relative to some truncated measure of the individ-
ual’s pre-retirement earnings might be taken to account for borrowing constraints
early in life. For instance, it is common to calculate replacement rates relative to
the highest thirty-five years of earnings, though the full working life from age 21
through Social Security’s normal retirement age now covers forty-five years.
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8. These figures, and others produced here, assume that scheduled Social Security
benefits will continue to be paid. Under current projections the combined Social
Security trust funds will become exhausted around the year 2030. Under current
law, at that point benefits would be reduced across the board by approximately
25%. No observers expect such an outcome, but these issues illustrate that future
Social Security benefit levels are uncertain.
9. Background on the models is available in Holmer et al. (2015). See <www.polsim.
com>.
10. This method of calculating the denominator of the replacement rate calculation
has relatively little distributional impact in any given year. However, changes in
interest rates can alter average replacement rates over time as the present value
of pre-retirement earnings changes.
11. Measured replacement rates at age 70 will be altered somewhat by mortality
between ages 62 and 70, which may disproportionately reduce the number of
low-earning retirees with above-average replacement rates while increasing the
number of widows, who also tend to have higher replacement rates.
12. See Butrica et al. (2012), table 6.
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